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Legal Policy, Technique and Research in Family
Law-Some Comparative Aspects
Anders Agell*
The title of this presentation refers to legal policy. I
believe, however, that there is one consideration that could be
seen as the leading objective in family law. That objective is to
create good living conditions for children, in an attempt to
ensure that the next generation is both clever and wise. This
goal is indirectly the most important reason for the existence of
the institution of marriage. Of course, the marriage institution
is also independently important for the relationship between
husband and wife. All other specific objectives in family law are
of a more variable character and do not have, in my opinion,
the same paramount importance.
Questions of legal technique are almost as important as
matters of legal policy. We may be better able to deal with
social issues if we assess the whole legal machinery of family
law with respect to its capacity to: (1) solve problems without
destroying human relations, and (2) do so in a way that
facilitates fairness, foreseeability, and cost-efficiency.
In many countries, modern family law develops in one and
the same direction. Two examples demonstrating this are: (1)
grounds for divorce have become more and more liberal; and (2)
partly as the result of changed sex-roles, joint custody has been
promoted more and more. The technical method for introducing
a change can differ, however. With regard to joint custody, the
substance of the concept "custody" can vary considerably. For
example, in the new English Children's Act the concept of
custody in the traditional sense has been abolished in favor of
the concept of parental responsibility. That change has been
combined with an introduction of some subconcepts which give
the courts competence to specify, if necessary, what each parent
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(or other caretaker) of the child is permitted to do or not to
do. 1
On a more general basis, I would like to emphasize the
technical differences in legal reasoning between common law
countries and civil law countries. 2 Today, legislation has
increased importance for legal development in common law
countries. My impression concerning family law is that in the
common law countries legislation provides more open solutions
than does equivalent legislation in civil law countries. The
common law courts thereby continue to play a more profound
role in legal development than their counterparts in civil law
countries.
Against this background, consider a hypothesis on
differences in legal thinking. In the law-making process, one
has to find the best considerations of legal policy for solving an
individual case. The outcome normally depends on application
of a legal rule that contains the special conditions, which I for
present purposes call concepts, applicable to the specific case.
One might say that the legal concepts are inserted as formally
decisive elements between the legal policy underlying the rule,
on the one hand, and the solution of the individual case on the
other hand.
My hypothesis is that legal concepts are sometimes given
less importance in the law-making process in common law
countries than in civil law countries. Fair solutions are
emphasized in common law countries, while foreseeability is
emphasized in civil law countries. Yet another way of
expressing this distinction is to say that in civil law systems
the final solutions to family law problems are created at an
earlier stage in the law-making process. The law, as enacted by
a legislature, emphasizes a specific set of conditions and by so
doing intentionally cuts off a number of possible arguments
that fall outside the chosen conditions or concepts.
Final solutions to family law problems in common law
systems, on the other hand, are crafted more individually as
the matter is heard in court. The final solution comes later in
the law-making process.
I now raise the question of what legal scholars do, and
what legal scholarship should imply. A simple answer is

1 Children's Act, 1989, ch. 41 (Eng.)
2 In this paper I do not propose that either common law or civil law
represent homogenous alternatives.
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impossible, since legal scholarship can use many different
methods. In my opinion, however, a legal scholar should choose
methods that differ from those used by a judge or a practicing
lawyer. Of course, there are similarities, but the differences are
more important. Both a judge and a practicing lawyer work
primarily on individual cases, the former to solve the case in a
suitable way, the latter to protect the interest of his client. The
legal scholar, however, should have as the main objective of his
or her study the system of rules within a special area. A core
part of a scholar's traditional legal study should be the
coherence of different rules, both formally and with respect to
the relationship between concepts and legal policy. In such an
undertaking the study of individual cases is only a tool for a
more far-reaching purpose. Such an approach offers the best
potential for interesting conclusions and gives a greater
possibility of influencing legal development. This approach
should also be of general societal value to a country, since its
legal system is scrutinized by scholars who have a systematic
and unbiased attitude. No other category of lawyers, not even
members of a supreme court or legislature, can claim this same
attitude.
The situation in the United States is a special one.
President Charles de Gaulle is reported as having once said
that it is impossible to govern a country that produces 189
different cheeses. Applying President de Gaulle's comment to
the United States, how does a legal scholar analyze legal
concepts that are sometimes alternative or compelling and
underlie the development of the law in over fifty different
jurisdictions? American legal scholars nonetheless must do this
and are doing it in a very interesting way, as this conference
has shown.
Certainly, the interaction between legislation and case law,
on the one hand, and legal scholarship on the other would be
worthy of a comparative study of its own. I believe that legal
scholars in the United States, who work with many
jurisdictions where case law is a leading source of legal
development, work and think in a manner that differs
considerably from the way of thinking of legal scholars in civil
law countries. My impression is that scholars in the common
law tradition concentrate on finding good solutions, as far as
legal policy is concerned, to social problems. Civil law scholars
have a greater interest in how the rules of legal solutions
should be conceptually construed or applied. The problems
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facing each legal system are the same, but the chosen starting
points, and manner of analysis, differ considerably.
Legal scholarship can imply the use of varying methods,
including legal-sociological, legal-economic, legal-psychological,
and other special perspectives. As already mentioned above, I
am personally inclined to emphasize the value of analyzing the
coherence of different legal policies, and above all, the
coherence of different legal concepts. A set of rules can be seen
as a building in which the foundation consists of the basic legal
rules and concepts construed with respect to the chosen
considerations of legal policy. In the upper floors we find more
specialized rules for more specific problems. However, if one
meets a problem on the second floor, one may well be required
to go down and study the foundation in order to find a coherent
solution.
One illustration of this analogy of legal rules as a building
may be the problem of contracts. Contracts present many
different problems in family law. Family law should not
abstain from using agreements to achieve peaceful solutions to
conflicts. Agreements cannot solve all problems, however, and
some legal rules (e.g., on responsibility for children or on the
basic duty to offer support during an existing marriage) should
be given a compulsory character that leaves little room to
negotiate a binding contract. The objective must be to find the
right balance between different policy considerations and to
transform the outcome into a coherent, comprehensive set of
rules for a great number of questions (such as children,
property, support, etc.) and different contractual problems, such
as the conditions for validity of a contract and the effect of
changed conditions. The analogy of a building, containing
different floors and apartments, might be rather useful for
describing how the role of contracts in family law should be
built up and applied.
In addition to the role of contracts in
family law, many more areas lend themselves to studies of a
systematic and conceptual character.
A second example is whether the acquisition of a
professional degree by one spouse should entitle the other, on
the occasion of divorce, to compensation. Three different
solutions have been used in American jurisdictions to award
compensation. American courts have applied rules on division
of property, on alimony, and on unjust enrichment to address
this question. As a legal scholar, I would find it natural to
study these alternatives by analyzing to what degree it is
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possible to construe the rules on property division, alimony,
and unjust enrichment in a systematically coherent way with
respect to the value of a professional degree.
A third problem suitable for conceptual analysis is the
relationship at divorce between the economic issues relating to
division of property, alimony, and maintenance. Obviously, the
division of property issue can influence the need for alimony,
and the topics of alimony and maintenance are linked to one
another. I believe, however, that for analytic purposes it is best
to treat the three issues as independently as possible. Such an
approach promotes foreseeability and counteracts
overbargaining and divorce conflicts. In common law there is
the well known objection to this approach that it does not
achieve the fairest result in individual cases. Nonetheless,
within reasonable limits it is precisely the advantage of the
legal method of conflict resolution that all possible arguments
are not put in one melting pot but structured in advance when
the rules are constructed. This is one expression of the peacemaking function of the whole legal system. I believe that a
marital property system which contains clear rules for division
of property is superior to a conceptually looser system for
division of separate property of spouses. Unfair result of a
marital property system can also be counteracted by special
rules for exceptional cases. There should be no basic
contradiction between fairness and foreseeability. Both
objectives should be combined.
A fourth example of a topic worthy of conceptual and
systematical analysis is the treatment in American law of
common law marriage and cohabitation outside marriage, in
comparison with formal marriage. With a growing number of
couples living together without formal marriage, there is a
need for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between these
three legal concepts, and their legal effect not only in family
and property law but also in tax law, social welfare law and
other legal areas. Courts will never perform the broad study
that is required by this topic.
In conclusion, I realize that my attitudes have been a bit
pretentious. I certainly cannot compete with my extremely
qualified audience when I comment upon American family law.
However, as the saying goes, in order to understand national
law one should study foreign law. I believe that, coming from
different legal traditions, we can learn much from one another.

